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Twelve Questions Answered 
 
The purpose of this letter is to offer some answers to the questions posed by Christopher 
Bellavita in the January 2010 issue of Homeland Security Affairs. The essay posed a 
series of significant issues that require far more than can be offered in a concise 
response. However, my intent is not to offer “the answer” to any of the questions but to 
offer “an answer” to each so as to provoke a continuing dialogue on these most 
important topics. 
As has been argued in seminars, around conference tables, and in the field, we as a 
community are still struggling with exactly what homeland security really means. In 
discussing this topic with practitioners and academics around the country, I find that 
perspectives shape responses. At the risk of over generalizing, those with homeland 
security responsibilities at the national level tend to focus on terrorism with natural or 
non-terror man-made disasters a distant secondary focus, while those at the state and 
local level have exactly the opposite view. There are clearly exceptions to these stances, 
but those exceptions are few and far between. Thus, the discussion of what exactly 
homeland security is or should be provides fertile ground for philosophical discourse.  
Given the above, individual perspective might shape how one might respond to these 
questions. Certainly my perspective, one of considerable sensitivity to state and local 
conditions, shapes my response. In articles written by me and published in this journal, 
I have argued very strongly that this disconnect in perspective lies at the very crux of 
some of the more troubling difficulties the nation faces in gaining as high a level of 
preparedness as possible. With that crystallized perspective in mind, I will attempt to 
address each of Dr. Bellavita’s questions. 
1. Why is it so difficult to make risk-based decisions in homeland security? 
Risk-based decisions are made every day in homeland security, either directly or 
indirectly. There is ample evidence that explicit, direct-risk calculations go into 
determining how much security should be placed around power plants, water treatment 
plants, etc.  Implicitly, risk is calculated in every public budget put forward by an elected 
body. Such is the essence of “public choice” economic theory: preferences made known 
to elected officials by the electorate are reflected in budgetary priorities for the 
community, county, city, or state.  
This same implied risk calculation goes into the budgetary process at the national 
level as well. Somewhere in this process, bureaucrats and elected officials must 
determine how large the defense budget must be, how much must be spent in health and 
human services, or how much must be put aside for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). Those officials, working through the budgetary process, 
must determine how much is going to be spent on intelligence, technology, and other 
law enforcement-oriented programs to battle terrorism around the world. 
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Perhaps implied in the question is why risk-based decision making is not used in 
distributing homeland security grant funding. Supposedly, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) is using risk modeling to make these determinations, though 
the risk modeling used by DHS remains an ephemeral illusion hidden behind smoke-
colored glass. Why those charged with homeland security responsibilities at the state 
and local level have not demanded transparency on this issue is quite beyond 
understanding. In fact, one will find entire divisions of Washington-based think tanks 
supporting DHS and devoted to risk modeling, yet the community is still in the dark (or 
worse, no further along than those with far less sophistication, resources, and 
administrative capacity using implicit methods). Perhaps the risk-based decisions being 
made are quite adequate already.  
2. Why are we unable to measure the relationship between homeland 
security expenditures and preparedness? 
Perhaps the question posed is not of a high enough level of abstraction. Perhaps the first 
issue to address is whether or not there is a relationship between expenditure and 
preparedness. Some would submit that based on the concept of marginal return – 
gaining measurable benefit for each dollar expended – the level of resources advanced 
has been inadequate to really gain advantage from economies of scale. Though the 
original amount of funding put forth by the national government (mostly in the form of 
unencumbered grants) provided a tangible shift in modernization and “preparedness,” 
the precipitous decline in funding each year, along with the increased bureaucratic 
hoops jurisdictions must negotiate to get funding, has had a chilling effect on 
preparedness fever. After state and local governments absorbed “homeland security” 
mission space into their already considerable mission requirements in emergency 
management and public safety, governments at the state and local level had to 
recalibrate priorities for a host of constituent expectations. There are other factors, 
however, that further bring the question as posed under more intense scrutiny. 
Implied in the question is that there is an idealized state of preparedness for the 
nation. There are many who take exception to such a position. The pragmatic view is 
that national, state, and local governments are spending all they are going to spend on 
homeland security and the nation is as prepared as it is going to be. Further, 
“preparedness” is fluid, changing with each day as communities deal with severe 
resource constraints, shifting “threat” priorities, and changing demography. The 
preparedness needs of a community are greatly affected by its aging population, the 
flight of young people, the influx of immigrant populations, the decline in revenue bases, 
and a host of other factors that affect a community’s ability to prepare for or respond to 
significant events.   
As the nation faces increasing budgetary deficits, mounting national debt and fewer 
options to regain economic resilience, one must ask how much longer the country can 
continue to prosecute two wars and increase public spending on entitlement programs 
and the expansion of government before the people resist at the cash register and rebel 
at the ballot box. As hard as one might try to marginalize local grassroots activism, a 
dramatic shift in preferences expressed by the people cannot long be ignored by those 
elected to represent those people. 
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3. Why is illegal immigration a homeland security issue? 
This question is a superb one. Again, one must examine the question from a national 
government perspective and then from a state and local government perspective. At the 
national level, the focus has been on terrorism and, to date, there is little evidence that 
terrorists have crossed our porous borders with the intent of perpetrating attacks on the 
people of this country.  However, such evidence may be emerging.  As Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller told Congress on March 19th of this year, al-
Qaeda is seeking to infiltrate operatives into the United States through both legal and 
illegal means. One could easily make the leap that such infiltration will take (or has 
taken) place across the southern border. Certainly, as the FBI grows more confident that 
such actions are taking place, illegal immigration takes on a decidedly significant 
homeland security priority. 
At the state and local level, illegal immigration and its impact on homeland security 
manifests itself in quite a different manner. Any action or set of actions that diminish 
the resilience of a community has homeland security implications. The presence of 
illegal immigrants in a community diverts resources away from the expressed 
preferences of the legal residents of the community. Illegal immigration imposes 
unfunded costs on communities most significantly in the form of support for public 
education, public safety, and public health. Depending on the source, one can attribute 
as much as $70-90 billion a year across the nation to support those who are in the 
country illegally. As is often the case, certainly in my part of the country, as young 
people with education and good work skills leave communities for better paying jobs, 
illegal immigrants come in behind so that populations do not appear to be affected but 
public revenues and consumer spending continue to decline. This displacement, not 
obvious to many, eventually erodes revenue streams to the point that overall services in 
the community decline precipitously. This decline further exacerbates the flight of those 
with skills so that, eventually, the community will have its resilience stretched to the 
breaking point. Regardless of the reasons so many choose to enter the country illegally, 
their accumulated presence in this country has significant homeland security impact.   
4. Why is FEMA still a part of the Department of Homeland Security? 
Again, a great question.  If one refers back to the opening paragraphs of this letter, DHS 
would be best focused on terrorism as this mission space seems most appropriate for a 
top-down, hierarchical approach to dealing with those challenges. The national 
government should lead this effort, and the effort should be predominantly dealt with 
through a partnership between DHS, the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  All other functions found in DHS should be moved out 
into a separate agency that deals with all other significant events. If FEMA is the right 
agency to be the centerpiece is arguable, but an agency that forms partnerships with 
state and local governments instead of coercive top-down regulation-heavy regimes is 
an appropriate response on the part of the national government to deal with the 
particular needs of all the other governments in this country. Further, this agency 
should work at giving state and local governments as much flexibility as possible in 
dealing with own-source challenges. By facilitating cooperative networks of 
communities/jurisdictions a far more realistic and pragmatic approach to all hazards 
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preparedness is a logical outcome. The national government should provide the 
organization around which such networking might take place. Again, if that organization 
is FEMA, so much the better. 
5. What can the nation realistically expect from its intelligence apparatus? 
It would be unrealistic to think that the intelligence apparatus of the nation will provide 
a 100 percent shield against terrorist attacks at home or abroad. That said, the gap 
between citizen expectations and a realistic level of defense provided by our intelligence 
networks could be quite large. The nation values individual liberty and freedom, so the 
balance between aggressive intelligence gathering and intrusions, visible or otherwise, 
into that free space must be carefully weighed. In this, I am deeply conflicted. I am a 
strong civil libertarian and am also acutely aware of the needs for comprehensive 
intelligence gathering. For counsel on this matter, I have to refer to a project upon 
which I worked several years ago. 
A small research team was asked to assess the psychological impact of acts of terror 
perpetrated against our national monuments. As one might imagine, the conclusions 
were that some national monuments held universal meaning for Americans while 
others, those typically viewed in a more regional perspective, were of less significance. 
However, what I found most interesting in the project was that there were models from 
which we might be informed about the impact of persistent terrorism on a society. Over 
time, societies gain a level of resilience to such events, particularly if one can focus on 
the perpetrators and acknowledge that terror events are going to be part of the everyday 
lives of the society. Sooner or later, communities gain a sense of normalcy that allows 
for the day to day activities of people to continue. It is this normalcy that seems to be at 
the crux of the matter. 
In America today, our sense of normalcy does not include persistent attack and 
significant loss of life and property. We must deal with anxiety caused by uncertainty, 
but not the kind of uncertainty that bring life and limb into the equation. To the extent 
that acts of terror remain discreet events, such as 9/11 or the Fort Hood shootings, the 
return to “normal” will likely be much like it was after those horrendous events.  Within 
weeks, most lives in America were pretty much back to what normal was before 9/11.  
Arguably, our politics and policies have returned to a pre-9/11 posture. If, however, 
sleeper cells of jihadists, or any other groups of extremists for that matter, were to be 
discovered, or worse, were to perpetrate a deliberate and methodical terror campaign 
against randomly chosen communities, our sense of normalcy would be significantly 
affected. At that point, the nation would have to enter a transition from one state of 
normal to quite another. Along the way, the balance between civil liberty and aggressive 
intelligence gathering might tip decidedly one way. The constancy of terror through 
observed action rather than through perceived threat is problematic.  
6. How does technology contribute to homeland security, and how does it 
make us more vulnerable? 
We are perhaps the most technologically advanced nation in the world. When I ask my 
students how many of them are active in social networking, all but one or two respond 
that they routinely visit Facebook and Twitter. Getting them to cease texting in class is a 
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challenge as is getting them to close their computers so we can conduct class in a more 
traditional manner. Technology, whether I like it or not, has affected how we teach and 
more significantly, how we learn. For the most part, these advances have been positive. 
Technology permeates everything we do. We cannot start our cars, wash our clothes, 
negotiate traffic, or take a flight without near total reliance on advanced mechanization 
of some form. For these advances, I think most of us are essentially grateful, all things 
being equal. However, with all the advances in technology come many factors that make 
us more vulnerable to exploitation. 
The question posed, however, is whether or not technology contributes to homeland 
security and whether or not our technology makes us more vulnerable. I assert that the 
answer is “yes” to both. 
When viewing technology through the prism of homeland security, the ability to 
gather and process information is greatly enhanced by our technological base. However, 
I am often reminded of the old joke about the drunk who lost the keys to his car. He was 
staggering around the base of a streetlight when he was approached by a Good 
Samaritan intent on helping the wayward soul. When asked what the problem might be, 
the drunk related that he had lost his keys. When asked if he had lost the keys near the 
streetlight, the drunk responded that “no” he had not lost the keys near the streetlight, 
but the light was better there. That is how I feel about technology and gathering 
intelligence about terror and terrorists. Are we relying too heavily on technology to help 
us with this task just because “the light is better?” As has been the intelligence challenge 
for the past several decades, human intelligence is hard to develop and cultivate. 
I worry about the technology question in respect to homeland security far more from 
a societal perspective than from one of intelligence and intelligence gathering. We have 
come to depend on technology to such an extent that if the various manifestations of 
technology in our society were to be threatened or taken down, our society would grind 
to a halt. Of most significance would be the impact of losing the technological continuity 
of our already fragile economy. Imagine what would likely take place in this country if 
we were to lose the ability to use credit and debit cards, to use our cell phones, to 
dispatch trains, planes, and trucks, to meter water or electricity to cities, and to dispatch 
emergency medical support to scenes of tragic events in our communities. Technology, 
then, might be considered our society’s Achilles Heel. 
Then again, we must consider what it might take to protect all the technology upon 
which we depend and whether or not those protective tactics might not cross the line 
into significant trespass on our civil liberties. One should always be mindful of Benjamin 
Franklin’s caution that those who trade security for liberty shall eventually have neither.  
7. Are the direct and indirect costs of security – for example aviation 
security – worth the benefits? 
When I teach my principles of economics class to my undergrads, the indoctrination 
into economic theory usually begins with learning that the answer to most questions in 
the dismal science should begin with the words “it depends.” Because the question 
posed is really a question of economics, the same preamble applies. At issue is 
determining what all the costs might be and then measuring those costs against real and 
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perceived benefits. If one focuses on aviation security as the test case, then the outcomes 
might inform one’s views of other areas of interest. 
As is often the case in the study of public policy, one is often confronted by the fact 
that bureaucracies are far more comfortable in dealing with and measuring outputs 
rather than outcomes. In aviation security, those outputs might very well be focused on 
the number of passengers processed, the time it takes to process a passenger, the 
amount of contraband seized in the screening process, the number of incidents that 
occur on flights, etc. But are we actually measuring outcomes along the way? I think not. 
The key outcome of strong and successful aviation security should be a complete 
absence of security incidents either in the process of loading and unloading flights or 
while any flight is airborne, regardless of point of origin. Clearly, we have not achieved 
this outcome. Because a significant in-flight incident could potentially lead to significant 
loss of life, a zero-tolerance position is necessary, regardless of cost. A successful terror 
attack on a flight with a lot of Americans on board would ripple through the psyche and 
economy of the nation at the speed of light. As mentioned above, our sense of normalcy 
would be under withering assault. 
Though there is no definitive answer given to the question posed, perhaps what we 
should all be thinking about is the idea that in order to truly measure costs and benefits, 
we need to focus on outcomes, not outputs. Then, perhaps, we can remove some of the 
ambiguity we face in assessing policy effectiveness and can mitigate the “it depends” 
start to our answers.   
8. How important is cyber security? 
Cyber security may be the most important element of a comprehensive strategy for 
securing the nation. As discussed above, our dependence on technology is so great that 
any interruption to the continuity of cyber space would have enduring and deleterious 
effects on our well-being. Unfortunately, the average citizen and nearly all government 
officials have little understanding of the components of cyber space and the security 
thereof. We are users and, other than dealing with the occasional computer virus, 
spyware or adware, we seldom think about the infrastructure, hardware, and software 
upon which we so depend. Further, we are generally consumers as individuals or as 
members of private enterprises. We are not sensitive to reporting interruptions to 
service or other difficulties we might encounter in our daily use of computers. We are 
more than likely to unplug our machines, take them so to some “geek squad” for repair 
and then go back to business as usual. 
The networks of which our cyber domains are comprised are infinitely complex. 
Unlike thinking organisms that deal with complexity by adapting to the perceived chaos 
of an uncertain situation, our machines are simply instruments that require human 
insight, intuition, adaptability, and action to survive deliberate, methodical assaults. The 
battle to protect our cyber space is, in many ways, similar to our battle against physical 
terrorism. The threat is ever changing and ever present. However, because the 
consequences of a catastrophic cyber attack could be as devastating as the detonation of 
a nuclear weapon on a major city, the strategies for fighting cyber warfare are likewise 
similar to those we employed during the Cold War. A defense in-depth is essential, but a 
cold, focused offensive capability is just as important to deter state sponsored attacks. At 
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the national level, I have a great deal of confidence we are doing a remarkable job of 
protecting our cyber space every day. However, at the state, local, enterprise, and 
individual level, increased awareness will increase protection.  
9. Can the values of security and privacy be complementary, or must they 
be competitive? 
This question is perhaps the most intriguing of those offered. Are security and privacy 
equal values, or is one more important than the other? Are the measures of security and 
privacy found on a continuum where absolute metrics can be assigned or are the 
measures of security and privacy relational and relative? 
Recently, I stumbled across a news item that expressed the notion that people in 
America really do not expect privacy, thus privacy may be a “devalued” value. 
Technology and our interaction in social networking lower our privacy protections. I 
suppose I can understand this line of thinking, but privacy, though not protected 
explicitly by the Constitution, is certainly an expectation upon which much legal opinion 
is based. One need go no further than Roe v. Wade to find the most significant Supreme 
Court case where privacy was the principle upon which this most profound of judgments 
was made. Thus, if privacy is to be protected to the extent outlined in legal precedent, 
then surely privacy becomes a more significant value than security. 
The measure of security could then be argued to be more relative in value than is 
privacy. If security is a relative state of being, then some level of risk can be entertained 
without subverting our sense of well-being or, dare I return there, our sense of 
normalcy. The state of our security changes as conditions change. If we live in a 
neighborhood that is evolving in a negative way toward more crime, then our security 
may be significantly compromised. If we live in a country that is under constant attack 
from illegal, dangerous elements, then our relative security is eroded. The security 
quotient of our nation was changed forever after 9/11, but our state of privacy was not 
affected as much. 
Security and privacy need not be placed at competitive opposites. Privacy, an 
enduring and protected state for most Americans, should be protected without much 
sensitivity to cost. Diminished security, measured as a relative state of being, is more 
likely to be accepted if society’s situational awareness is increased. Raising awareness 
does not have to come at the expense of privacy.       
10. Under what conditions will the United States torture people? 
This question is the most troubling to me. Allow me to rephrase the question to read: 
Under what circumstances will officials of the United States government, on behalf of 
the American people, resort to intelligence gathering tactics than could be defined by a 
reasonable person as torture? This phrasing of the question seems to offer a much 
clearer picture of the conundrum that our intelligence operatives should address before 
taking any actions. Had this question been in the forefront of our intelligence-gathering 
activities in the aftermath of 9/11, perhaps we would not have to address this situation at 
all. 
Hardly anyone involved in the intelligence activities related to 9/11 and the two wars 
we are fighting will read this letter or this journal. At issue is an American value of 
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decency and respect for human life. Though the fabric of the nation is currently littered 
with contradictions to this precept, most Americans still adhere to the notion that we, as 
a people, should be above resorting to questionable forms of interrogation to gather 
information, regardless of what might be at stake. The first question could be shunted 
off as a hypothetical that does not require an answer. The first question could be 
dismissed because some would say that if American lives are at stake, any technique is 
justified. There is one caveat that might bring us to a different conclusion: What would 
we have done under the same circumstances? 
History is replete with stories of dutiful individuals following orders, doing what they 
thought was best under the circumstances. I can relate to my own experiences in 
stressful situations, resorting to actions that, in the calm of a later day, I wanted to 
reconsider. My statement here in no way relieves those that violated that perceived 
value of decency; I offer the statement so that others will be more considerate in their 
judgments of those who are faced with difficult choices that might very well affect the 
security of the nation. 
11. Is it necessary to understand Islam to develop an effective 
counterterrorism policy? 
There is a short, concise answer to this question: yes. Yet understanding Islam as a 
religion will not likely give us the necessary insights into the mindset of those who wish 
to do us harm in the name of Allah. We need to understand the gang mentality, the 
sense of desperation, the sense of zealotry, and the concept that there are people on this 
earth who truly hate America and all for which it stands. We should, however, be totally 
unapologetic about this nation and our system of values. 
We need to embrace the notion that America is an exceptional country with 
exceptional people living here. We need to embrace the notion that we provide 25 
percent of the economy of the world. Our productivity and work ethic are the envy of the 
world. Even the poorest among us lives a relatively safe and secure life. We are a nation 
that believes in individual freedom, accountability, and merit. We resist collectivism and 
any form of suppression, whether that suppression is of our speech or practice of 
religion. We resist the suppression of groups of people because of their color, gender, 
age, or station in life. Because we embrace liberty, individual freedom, and merit, our 
value system is a direct threat to those who seek tyranny, whether they be sectarian or 
secular in their persuasions. As long as this great nation exists, there will be those who 
will want to destroy everything we treasure. That’s OK, because we are a nation of laws, 
not men, so we will, as a nation, endure. 
12. What can the homeland security enterprise learn from the apparent 
success managing the H1N1 pandemic? 
The answer to this question is relatively short: it’s too early to tell if we can learn 
anything valuable from the “pandemic” identified with the H1N1 strain of influenza. To 
date, there have been approximately 12,000 deaths attributed to this particular disease, 
a far cry from what was predicted early on. Perhaps the outbreak was not as bad as was 
first anticipated or perhaps we were so efficient in our response that we were able to 
mitigate an otherwise dangerous situation. We need to let the dust settle on this before 
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arriving at conclusions about success or failure. Whether there are positive lessons for 
those of us with homeland security responsibilities is yet to be determined. 
Thank you for your time and consideration. I look forward to a lively dialogue on 
these and other questions that will arise during the next year. As we are all focused on 
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